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Abstract 
 This study examines the affect of winning an Academy Award on the stock price of 
parent companies.  On average, receiving an Oscar has no significant impact on the stock of 
parent companies during the few days surrounding the broadcast of the Academy Awards.  
The findings of this study introduce questions of external interference and possible 
limitations on this type of research.  However, my study sheds light on future topics of 
investigation for analyzing the effects of televised award shows on the stock market.   
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1. Introduction 
 This event study examines how winning an Academy Award affects the stock of 
parent companies.  I predict that the parent companies of Oscar winners will see a significant 
positive return on their shares the next trading day following the broadcast of the Academy 
Awards. I think winning an award will increase investor confidence in parent companies by 
revealing that these companies increase firm value through the funding of the United States’ 
most popular motion pictures. 
 There are only three observations that produced significant results in the entirety of 
this study.  In 1993 Sony Corporation realized significant cumulative abnormal returns of 
6.29%, in 2006 General Electric Company had significant returns of 4.15%, and in 2009 
Comcast Corporation experienced well-above average cumulative abnormal returns of 
18.41%.  The average abnormal return over the event window for each of these observations 
resulted in values that greatly differed from their daily average return for the year that the 
significant observation took place; Sony, General Electric, and Comcast realized an annual 
average daily return of 0.17%, 0.04%, and 0.04%, respectively.  Their average abnormal 
returns over the event window were 1.26%, 0.83%, and 3.68%, respectively. This seems to 
indicate that the event window does capture a period of noteworthy abnormal returns.  
External events at the time of these significant observations were analyzed to determine if the 
possibility of outside interference existed.  Each company has a different structure that could 
account for a range of stock influxes during the event window, but there is no evidence that 
indicates the operations of these companies directly interfered with the experiment.   
The findings of this study are quite varied, but the underlying trend reveals a negative 
cumulative abnormal return for the event window.  The cumulative abnormal return of 
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Oscar-winning parent companies over the period of 1990 to 2009 is -0.31%; however, this 
value is not significant at the 5% level.  Overall, there appears to be no impact on parent 
company returns for winning an Academy Award in the six categories included in this study: 
Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, Best Supporting Actress, Best Director, and 
Best Picture. 
 Follow-up statistical tests were implemented to determine if any specific award 
caused a significant increase in a company’s cumulative abnormal return over the course of 
the event or average abnormal return on the event date.  A variable indicating if a film was of 
“blockbuster” status – grossing $100 million or more in box office revenue – before the 
Academy Awards and a multiple wins variable were also tested to see if the popularity of the 
film or number of wins had any significant impact on the stock of parent companies.  These 
additional regressions produced no significant results at the 5% level.  I predicted that the 
more prestigious categories, such as Best Picture or Best Actor, would indicate positive 
abnormal returns, but the tests show no change in parent company stock for any of the 
variables included in the follow-up analysis. 
 This study attempts to fill the gap that exists in research on televised award 
ceremonies.  Extensive research has been done on a variety of broadcasted events, such as 
the Super Bowl, but there exists only limited examination of the effect award ceremonies has 
on the stock market.  This type of research could be beneficial to entertainment companies.  
Investors might view awards as indicators of a company’s success and use the information 
provided by award shows as a basis for their financial decisions.  I found this possibility 
intriguing and decided to create an event study that measures the impact of winning an 
Academy Award on parent company’s stock returns. Unfortunately, my study did not 
3 
 
produce the expected results, but it does provide a basis for further research focused on the 
field of award ceremonies.  I hope future investigations will generate more telling 
information about the impact of these ceremonies on investor decisions. 
From this point forward, the text includes five remaining sections.  A literature 
review immediately follows the introduction and illustrates several articles that contributed to 
the creation of this study.  The data section comes next and contains a description of the 
dataset, along with an analysis of the parent companies that supply the observations of the 
experiment.  The subsequent methodology section outlines the structure of the event study 
and the statistical approach implemented for any calculations completed during the research 
process.  The results section follows, describing the outcome of all tests conducted during 
this study.  The last section consists of concluding statements, an analysis of possible 
limitations, and suggested future research. 
2. Literature Review 
The inspiration for this project was the recent Michelle Obama event study.1  David 
Yermack examined the affect of Michelle Obama’s clothing choices on the stock prices of 
apparel companies, and he calculated that one of the First Lady’s trips to Europe in 2009 
resulted in an approximate effect of $2.3 billion on the fashion industry.  According to his 
study, Michelle Obama has a redistribution of value affect on the industry; the stock prices of 
the clothing companies she does not wear drops, while the firms responsible for the clothes 
she wears realize an increase in stock prices.  The fact that one individual’s clothing 
decisions – a person who has no direct connection to the world of fashion – could have such 
an impact on the fashion industry’s stock returns is amazing.  I became interested in 
                                                          
1
 Yermack, David. 2010. The Michelle Markup: The First Lady’s Impact on Stock Prices of Fashion 
Companies. Stern School of Business, New York University. (Apr. 25): pp. 1-24. 
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researching what else the public is exposed to that impacts their investment decisions.  I 
chose to look at the affects of televised award ceremonies.  Broadcasted award ceremonies 
appeared to be an area that has yet to be extensively researched. In fact, the only article that 
focused on the market reaction to the Academy Awards was a study by Randy Nelson, 
Michael Donihue, Donald Waldman, and Calibraith Wheaton. 
Nelson et al. conducted an event study to determine the box-office worth of an 
Academy Award.2 They hoped to show that moviegoers use Oscar nominations as a cue for 
which films to view in theaters.  Weekly box-office data was collected for both nominated 
and a sample of non-nominated films during the period of 1978-1987.  The researchers 
attempted to value the effect of winning an Oscar on the market share of theaters, average 
revenue per screen, and probability of survival once the Academy Award nominations were 
announced.  The authors used two main measurements: the percentage of total screens on 
which the film appeared (SHARE) and the average revenue per screen (ARPS).  Several 
different models were implemented throughout the study to ensure the strength of the results.  
The findings of the study were as the authors predicted – an overall increase in 
revenue following the announcement of Oscar nominations.  A ‘Best Supporting 
Actor/Actress’ nomination had little statistical significance for both the SHARE and ARPS 
measurement. A ‘Best Actor/Actress’ nomination only shows a significant increase in the 
SHARE measurement, but a nomination for ‘Best Picture’ produced significant increases in 
both measurements.3 With the ‘Best Actor/Actress’ and ‘Best Picture’ nominations 
increasing predicted box-office revenues by $476,617 and $4,799,118, respectively.4  
                                                          
2
 Nelson, Randy A. 2001. What's an Oscar worth? Economic Inquiry 39 (1) (01): 1-16. 
3
 Nelson, Ibid, 6. 
4
 Ibid, 15. 
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The duration of a film’s stay in the Top 50 film category was also examined.  Nelson 
et al. posed the hypothesis that a nomination could extend the length of time a film remained 
in theaters and cause a film that had disappeared from theaters to be released for a second 
time.5  The results again agreed with the suggested hypothesis, but the more striking finding 
was the fact that it paid off to delay the release of the film. By waiting to release a film until 
the fourth quarter of the year, the film’s revenues were $7,829,797 compared to only 
$673,082 for those released in the first quarter.6  These results offer insight into the 
distribution methodologies of major movie corporations; if distribution companies were not 
previously aware of this large disparity in revenues, they could now take advantage of this 
information and delay the release of films, especially those which have a chance at an Oscar. 
The findings in this article are of value to the participants in the movie business, and “What’s 
an Oscar Worth?” is one of the only articles that provides the industry with this type of 
market information on award ceremonies. 
The other studies done on the Academy Awards do not reflect the type of research I 
undertake in my event study as closely as Nelson et al.’s article; however, it was interesting 
to see what researchers have done with the Academy Awards thus far. Donald Redelmeier 
and Sheldon Singh have completed two studies focused on how an Oscar impacts the lives of 
screenwriters and actors and actresses. In one study, they determine whether there is a 
correlation between success and longevity of award-winning screenwriters.7 
For this article, information was collected on the winners and nominees for ‘Best 
Original Screenplay’ and “Best Adapted Screenplay’ between the years of 1929-2001.  The 
                                                          
5
 Nelson, Ibid, 9. 
6
 Ibid, 16. 
7
 Redelmeier, Donald A., and Sheldon M. Singh. 2001. Longevity of Screenwriters who win an Academy 
Award: Longitudinal Study. BMJ: British Medical Journal 323 (7327) (Dec. 22 - 29): pp. 1491-1496.  
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median age at time of death by 2001 was 68 years. According to this study, winners had 
shorter lives than nominees by 3.6 years.8 The authors are sure to state that there are many 
factors that could contribute to this reduction in life for winning screenwriters with behavior 
being one of the most important factors. However, the article concludes that success may 
lead to worse health for some groups of individuals. 
The finding of longevity in screenwriters is in stark contrast to that of the results from 
Redelmeier and Singh’s second study.  A total of 1649 Award-winning actors and actresses 
were analyzed; 762 of them being actors and actresses nominated for “Best Actor,” “Best 
Actress,” or “Best Supporting Actor/Actress” and 887 individuals were members of the same 
cast and of the same sex as the nominee.9  The median age was 66 years old, and the life 
expectancy for winners was 3.9 years.  If an individual won multiple times, there was an 
even more significant reduction in their death rate, increasing longevity by 6 years.10  The 
article closes with the fact that increased longevity in celebrities may be partially explained 
by their success.  With the contradicting results found in Redelmeier and Singh’s articles, life 
expectancy must greatly vary with occupation, even within the same industry, such as the 
entertainment business. 
Again, the two Redelmeier and Singh’s articles do not present the type of information 
that will be discussed in my study, but these projects illustrate the possible research that can 
be based on the information provided by award ceremonies.  The limited number of available 
studies on the Academy Awards also exhibits the lack of market research done in this area of 
                                                          
8
 Redelmeier, Ibid, 1494. 
9
 Redelmeier, Donald A., and Sheldon M. Singh. 2001. Survival in Academy Award-Winning Actors and 
Actresses. BMJ: British Medical Journal 134 (10) (May 15): pp. 955-961. (958) 
10
 Redelmeier, “Survival in Academy Award-Winning Actors and Actresses,” Ibid, 961. 
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televised award shows.  One award ceremony that does offer some literature on the market 
impact of its awards is the Grammy’s. 
Authors Mary Watson and N. Anand examine how the Grammy’s came to influence 
the album sales of nominees and winners.11  Watson and Anand were interested in answering 
the longtime question of, “Does a Grammy improve record sales?” In order to answer this 
question, the researchers collected album sales data for ‘Best New Artist’ nominees from the 
years 1970-1994.  This included the artists’ current album during the nomination and all 
subsequent albums during the stated time period.  They only used new artist data because 
other artist could have increased their sales through previous recognition and other actions.  
Each artist’s sales performance was evaluated by three variables – sales certified by RIAA 
(Recording Industry Association of America), the number of albums certified ‘gold’ or 
‘platinum’ by RIAA, and the number of days their certified albums continued to sell.12 
 According to the article, ‘Best New Artist’ winners do sell more albums than 
nominees; winners sold 10.91 million units compared to nominees with only 5.4 million units 
in sales.13  Since the empirical results were based on quantitative sales data, the study does 
not explain why the winners sold more albums than nominees, and the authors try to find 
other factors that attributed to artist’s success following the Grammy’s, such as interviews 
and magazine placement.  Through the use of this alternative material, Watson and Anand 
show a Grammy Award is, in fact, a very useful and influential “promotional vehicle.”14 
An award can be viewed as a tool used to affect the decision of investors or 
consumers.  This aspect of televised award ceremonies connects to the much broader field of 
                                                          
11
 Watson, Mary R., and N. Anand. 2006. Award Ceremony as an arbiter of Commerce and Canon in the 
Popular Music Industry. Popular Music 25 (1, Special Issue on Canonization) (Jan.): 41-56.  
12
 Watson, Ibid, 50. 
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Ibid, 49. 
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advertising which utilizes instruments, such as television commercials or magazine ads, to 
influence the decision of consumers.  The National Football League’s Super Bowl seems to 
have become the pinnacle of advertising competition.  Millions of dollars are spent on each 
30-second advertising slot during the day of the Super Bowl, and today, even individuals 
who have no interest in football will watch the ‘big game’ just to see the commercials.   
 Authors Frank Fehle, Sergey Tsyplakov, and Vladimir Zdorovtsov investigated the 
market’s reaction to the commercials of nineteen different Super Bowls over the years of 
1969-2001.15  They were interested in whether or not Super Bowl commercials affect 
investor behavior.  If they were successful in finding a link between commercials and 
investors behavior, Fehle et al. planned to focus on two main topics: what type of investors 
were most influenced and whether the effects were short or long term. 
 The study contained information on 894 commercials and a total of 348 different 
businesses.16  After each commercial was categorized by the various study-specific qualities, 
such as apparent company recognition, stock data was collected for each of firm. The event 
date was the Monday after each Super Bowl aired, the event window was 20-trading days 
after each game, and the estimation window was 250-trading days before the 20-day window 
preceding the game.17  Abnormal returns were found for those firms who were easily 
identified by their ads and increased with the number of firm-specific commercials that 
appeared during the Super Bowl.  Fehle, Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov were also able to show 
that small investors were the ones whose investing decisions were influenced the most by 
Super Bowl advertisements and that these returns last for a significant period after the game 
                                                          
15
 Fehle, Frank, Sergey Tsyplakov, and Vladimir Zdorovtsov. 2005. Can Companies influence Investor 
Behaviour through Advertising? Super Bowl Commercials and Stock Returns. European Financial 
Management 11 (5) (11): pp. 625-47. 
16
 Fehle, Ibid, 630. 
17
 Ibid, 634. 
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was broadcasted.  Research on advertising has been quite extensive over the years, and Fehle 
et al.’s study illustrates the type of examination done on advertising.  
Karen Machleit, Chris Allen, and Thomas Madden have also contributed to this field 
of academia and attempted to explain “how affect producing ads can influence repeat 
purchasing for mature brands.”18 They realized most research in this field had focused on the 
effects of ads on those consumers new to a brand, not whether the ad had any sway over the 
familiar consumer.  Of course, if they were to be successful in showing that ads have no 
effect on repeat buyers, then mature brand advertising is economically inefficient and the 
product itself is responsible for capturing the repeat consumer.  However, the authors were 
careful to acknowledge that advertising for mature brands is “designed more to entertain than 
to communicate product benefits.”19   
Commercials for Pepsi Cola and Levi’s 501 blue jeans were chosen as the test 
stimuli. These commercials were placed within a 15-minute game show program to ensure 
the nature of the real experiment was masked.  The previous exposure to these commercials 
was measured, and well above 75% of participants said that they had at least seen each 
commercial once before.  Brand interest – the base level of approachability, inquisitiveness, 
openness, or curiosity an individual has about a brand – and other test variables were 
measured through the use of a questionnaire on the day of the initial viewing and voluntary 
follow-up meeting four weeks later. 20 
 According to Machleit, Allen, and Madden’s findings, brand interest should be the 
dominant focus of mature brand advertising. The authors were forthcoming with several 
                                                          
18
 Machleit, Karen A., Chris T. Allen, and Thomas J. Madden. 1993. The Mature Brand and Brand Interest: An 
Alternative Consequence of Ad-Evoked Affect. The Journal of Marketing 57 (4) (Oct.): 72-82. 
19
 Machleit, Ibid, 72.  
20
 Ibid, 73. 
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limitations of their research and state that without further empirical study of brand interest, 
they do not think offering detailed marketing advice is the outcome of their research. The 
results of this experiment were not, in a sense, groundbreaking, but rather, a gateway for 
further examination, and the authors end the article’s discussion section with the statement, 
“the possible relevance of brand interest for evaluating ad effectiveness does merit brief 
consideration,” implying the importance of extended research in this area.21 
 Research on advertising can be very beneficial to the marketing strategies of mature 
brands for it can create a renewed since of intrigue for an existing product or increase the 
appeal of an unknown brand.  The two articles on advertising demonstrate the detailed 
research completed in that field.  Hopefully one day this type of in-depth research will also 
be focused on the world of televised award ceremonies, like the Oscars.  When constructing 
this literature review, I realized a large area of research has yet to be explored. Specifically, 
with the lack of available texts and studies involving the Academy Awards, there seems to be 
a hole surrounding this award ceremony.  I plan to fill part of this gap with my research on 
the returns to parent companies of Academy Award winners.  I believe my study will 
contribute to the ongoing efforts to explain the market’s reaction to award winners and how 
investors’ financial decisions are based on the information provided by televised events. 
3. Data Composition 
 I compiled a database of Academy Award winners from 1990 to 2010. In total, there 
were 120 wins observed during the time period of this study.  I gathered all award 
information from the Academy Awards website: The Official Academy Awards Database.22  
I chose this time period because it includes the most up-to-date investing techniques and was 
                                                          
21Machleit, Ibid, 79. 
22
 Academy Awards Database: http://awardsdatabase.oscars.org/ampas_awards 
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a period of innovation in the film industry.  The information I collected from the Academy 
Awards database includes the categories of Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, 
Best Supporting Actress, Best Director, and Best Picture. Appendix 1. E lists all category 
winners for the duration of the study.  The six awards above are the categories that I expect 
to have the greatest influence on the decision-making process of investors.  They also seem 
to be the categories that receive the most media coverage. 
 There are quite a few interesting statistics about the award data included in this event 
study.  Over the study’s twenty year span, there were only four directors whose films earned 
them a Best Director award, but did not go on to win the award for Best Picture. These films 
were Ang Lee’s Brokeback Mountain in 2005, Roman Polanski’s The Pianist in 2002, Steven 
Soderbergh’s Traffic in 2000, and Steven Spielberg’s Saving Private Ryan in 1998.  Clint 
Eastwood was the only director to win multiple Best Picture Awards over this time period for 
his 1992 film Unforgiven and his 1994 film Million Dollar Baby.  Eastwood also appeared in 
the Best Picture films he directed, and two other award-winning directors played a part in 
their movies as well.  In 1995, Mel Gibson starred in Braveheart, and in 1990, Kevin Costner 
played the lead role of Dances with Wolves.  Both actor/directors won the Best Director 
Award, and their films also took home the award for Best Picture which is quite an 
achievement.  Except for Mel Gibson, the roles these actor/directors portrayed earned them a 
nomination for Best Actor – Eastwood being nominated for both films he directed and starred 
in. However, neither one received an award in that category. 
 The three individuals mentioned above – Kevin Costner, Mel Gibson, and Clint 
Eastwood – were able to win an award in multiple of the six categories analyzed in this 
study; the only other person to achieve this feat besides a director in the past twenty years is 
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Kevin Spacey.  His role in the 1999 Best Picture film, American Beauty, won him the award 
for Best Actor.  Prior to this success, he won the Best Supporting Actor Award in 1995 for 
the character he portrayed in The Usual Suspects.  There were only two other actors and one 
actress that were able to win multiple awards over the span of this event study.  Hilary Swank 
won a Best Actress award for her roles in two Best Picture award-winning films Million 
Dollar Baby and Boys Don’t Cry in 2004 and 1999, respectively.  Sean Penn achieved his 
multiple awards in the Best Actor category for the part he played in the 2008 film Milk and 
the 2003 film Mystic River.  The third actor to accomplish the feat of multiple wins in the 
same category is Tom Hanks.  The characters he portrayed in the 1994 film Forrest Gump 
and 1993 film Philadelphia earned him the award of Best Actor.  Tom Hanks is also the only 
individual over the past twenty years – out of all six categories – to win an award two years 
in a row.  For a comprehensive list of the awards and nominations that an actor, actress, 
director, or film has achieved since the commencement of the Academy Awards, please visit 
the Official Academy Awards Database website. 
The United States theatrical distribution information was collected for each 
observation during the twenty year time period.  The U.S. distribution company was used 
because the study only focuses on the reaction of domestic markets. I chose the theatrical 
distribution, since other forms of distribution, such as home video or DVD, may take place 
long after the Academy Award broadcast.  The Internet Movie Database provided the 
distribution and parent company information for each film.23  With the data, I created a 
summary of parent companies and the number of winners or nominations they received in 
annual tables like the one found at Appendix 1. A. Once all of the preliminary information 
                                                          
23
 Internet Movie Database: http://www.imdb.com 
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was organized, I went through each observation and made several exclusions to narrow my 
original sample selection. 
Sample Selection 
 Observations were excluded if the parent company information was not available; this 
omission includes any number of wins the firm may have had during a single year.  The 
company that was ruled out the most for this reason is currently known as NBCUniversal, 
LLC.  Any wins from this company before the year 2002 are not included in my event study.    
Information on exactly who benefited from Universal Pictures winning an Academy Award 
during the period of 1990-2001 was not available.  Universal Pictures was its own entity for 
some years prior to 1990, but had several changes in ownership, including such companies as 
the Canadian spirits company Seagram’s.  The constant change of ownership is why the 
exclusions were made.  It is also important to note that NBCUniversal has split ownership; 
General Electric owns 49% of the company, and Comcast owns the remaining 51%.  Both 
General Electric and Comcast are listed as parent companies in this study.  The stock data 
were separated for these two firms, but they were denoted with the same event date if 
NBCUniversal film won an award.   
 Companies were only counted as one observation per year, even if they won awards 
in multiple categories.  This was the source of several exclusions from the original data 
sample.  However, a follow-up test does take the number of wins into consideration in order 
to see if there is an impact on the returns of those companies who did receive multiple 
awards in a single year.  Further exclusions were made based on the fact that some firms are 
privately owned.  The Weinstein Company and DreamWorks Pictures are examples of 
privately owned entertainment companies.  Since the stock data for these firms are not 
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public, it was not possible to include them in this study. The last omissions were made when 
collecting the stock data for all of the included parent companies. 
 I accessed the Wharton Research Data Services and used the CRSP, the Center for 
Research in Security Prices, database to gather daily stock data for each observation.24  Data 
was collected for the year before and the year of the Oscars for the parent companies in the 
final sample.  This data included the holding period returns for the companies’ value-
weighted returns including distributions.  A table of the final sample selection is located at 
Appendix 1. B.  Appendix 1. C includes a list of the companies that represent at least one 
observation in the study. 
The table at Appendix 1. C also provides the total number of wins achieved by each 
company over the duration of the study.  The company that had the most wins in one year (of 
the six categories I measure) was a three way tie at four of the six different award categories: 
The Walt Disney Company, Time Warner, and Orion Pictures Corporation.  The latter of the 
three companies listed is not included in my study, but both Walt Disney and Time Warner 
achieved four wins in a single year two different times in the twenty year period.  For those 
individuals who are curious which movies accumulated these awards, Appendix 1. D lists the 
year, company, movie, and which categories were won. 
Parent Company Description 
The nature and structure of the companies included in the study varies greatly.  Of the 
nine companies that are included in the final sample selection of this event study, I would 
label four as conglomerate-type businesses – The Walt Disney Company, NBCUniversal’s 
General Electric Company and Comcast Corporation, and Sony Corporation.  These 
companies are placed in the conglomerate category for they have many business segments 
                                                          
24
 Wharton Research Data Services: https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
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that are not directly related to the entertainment and media industry as the other firms in the 
event study.  It is important to identify the conglomerates of this study because their other 
endeavors may affect the company’s stock price during the time of the event window.  I will 
now give a brief overview of the structure of each company included in this study.  All firm-
specific information was found online at the individual company’s official website. 
The composition of NBCUniversal, LLC, provides the best example of how the 
structure of a company may limit the effects of one specific event on the stock price of an 
entire company.  Two companies share ownership of this United States film distributor.  
General Electric Company has ownership rights over 49% of the company; Comcast 
Corporation owns the remaining 51% with the majority interest in the company.25  Since 
NBCUniversal is almost divided in half, both split-ownership companies are included in this 
study.  It is difficult to tell if one side of the company realizes the effects of the Academy 
Awards over the other, and the structures of the two owner firms supply the additional 
possibility of outside interference during this event study.   
As its own entity, NBCUniversal has a large focus in the television broadcasting 
industry, including several successful channels such as Bravo, Oxygen, E! Entertainment, 
and Syfy.  Focus Features is one of NBCUniversal’s main movie production and distribution 
companies, and this company appeared multiple times when all of the Academy Award 
nomination and win data was gathered.  The company also has complete ownership over the 
Universal Studios Hollywood theme park and a 50% ownership stake in the Universal 
Orlando Resort. These theme parks are based on the films that Universal Studios has 
produced and distributed over the years.  A fairly recent example of how the parks are based 
on successful NBCUniversal productions is The Wizarding World of Harry Potter that 
                                                          
25
 NBCUniversal Website: http://www.nbcuni.com/about-us/ 
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opened at Islands of Adventure in June 2010.  Although NBCUniversal’s focal point is the 
entertainment business, its parent companies General Electric Company and Comcast are not 
centered on this industry. 
Of the two controlling companies of NBCUniversal, Comcast Corporation is the more 
entertainment driven business.  Comcast claims to be one of the largest high-speed internet 
and telephone services providers.26  With the majority stake in NBCUniversal, they have a 
claim on all of NBCUniversal’s media ventures, even if Comcast is not directly involved in 
any stage of the development process of projects, like motion pictures.  This could create 
problems for investors who want to invest in NBCUniversal, but do not know if their money 
should go to Comcast or General Electric.  The internet and communications industries are 
also not directly linked to movie business, yet anyways.  These industries are closely related, 
but investing in a company with a focus on communications, such as telephone services, does 
not mean you are also investing in the film industry. 
In a recent development as of late 2009, Comcast made a bid to buy NBCUniversal 
from General Electric.  According to an article of the New York Times, news of the 
negotiations between partial owners of NBCUniversal – Comcast and General Electric 
Company – was publicized in September 2009, but apparently these companies were 
deliberating for the previous seven months.27  General Electric Company finally accepted 
Comcast’s in December of 2009; however, this deal was not approved by the government 
until January 2011.28  The timing of this announcement only allows for a possible impact on 
                                                          
26
 Comcast Website: 
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/About/PressRoom/CorporateOverview/CorporateOverview.html 
27
 Arango, Tim. “G.E. Makes It Official: NBC Will Go to Comcast.” The New York Times. Media & 
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the last year of this study’s dataset, 2010 (the Academy Awards ceremony for 2009 films).  
This declaration of intent to purchase could affect both Comcast Corporation and General 
Electric Company. 
General Electric Company, commonly referred to as GE, is further removed from the 
motion picture business.  The company comprises of a large number of businesses in 
numerous industries.  The statement on their online information page exemplifies how 
diverse the company is, “GE is a global infrastructure, finance, and media company taking on 
the world’s toughest challenges. From everyday light bulbs to fuel cell technology, to 
cleaner, more efficient jet engines, GE has continually shaped our world with 
groundbreaking innovations for over 130 years.”29  The diversity of this company has many 
advantages, but it causes problems for my study.  I want to measure only the reactions of 
those investors who use the Academy Awards as a cue for which companies to invest in.  If 
they feel their money will not go into the production of future motion pictures, these 
investors may not want to put their funds into companies like GE.  However, if investors 
view winning an Academy Award as a sign of a firm making wise funding decisions, then 
the aforementioned issue may not be a problem; the investor would still put their money into 
General Electric even though they are not strictly an entertainment business. 
The Walt Disney Company does not pose as many possible difficulties for investor 
decisions as the structure of NBCUniversal; however, the company has large stakes in 
markets other than the film industry.  Disney divides itself into four business segments: 
media networks, parks and resorts, studio entertainment, and consumer products.30  The 
media network and consumer products divisions are what lead me to classify Walt Disney as 
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a conglomerate-type company.  Networks such as the Disney Channel, ABC Family, ESPN 
Inc., and SOAPnet are all controlled by the Walt Disney Company.  Even though television 
networks offer a similar service to consumers as the movie industry, they are not fully 
intertwined with motion pictures. 
The consumer products sector of The Walt Disney Company has grown into one of 
their largest endeavors.  The creation of the Disney Store – a store that sells only Disney 
merchandise – shows the significance of this product market to the Disney Company.  
However, this merchandising focus could be advantageous for investors, especially those 
who choose to invest in companies of award-winning films.  If a company releases films that 
are successful enough for stores to sell merchandise based solely on those movies, another 
source of profit for their investors has been created.  The main motion picture companies 
controlled by Disney actually appeared numerous times throughout the data collection 
process for this study.  Miramax Films, the entertainment branch of Disney responsible for 
the company’s more serious motion pictures, dominated the nominations for the six 
categories included in the study during the mid-1990 to early 2000’s, and if Disney had a win 
during this period, Miramax Films was usually the U.S. distributor behind the award-winning 
film. 
On the corporate information page of Sony Corporation’s official website, there is 
almost nothing stated about their role in the film industry.31  In fact, the list of their major 
products only includes the categories: audio, video, televisions, information and 
communications, semiconductors, and electronic components. Sony Corporation primarily 
focuses on the electronics industry, like the creation of the PlayStation gaming console, not 
motion pictures.  One must look at the website for their United States subsidiary – Sony USA 
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or Sony Corporation of America – to find information on their involvement in the 
entertainment business.32  The major motion picture companies of Sony Corporation are 
Columbia Pictures, TriStar Pictures (which is now consolidated into Columbia TriStar 
Motion Picture Group), and Sony Picture Classics.  Sony Picture Classics is much like 
Miramax films of Disney; they focus on films that are not as mainstream as other Academy 
Award pictures with many being foreign language films.  Both Columbia Pictures and Sony 
Picture Classics have films that are observations for the Sony Corporation in this study. 
Since the remaining companies are more directly focused on the entertainment 
industry, I will give a short description of each without the problems that may arise from 
their business operations, as done above, starting with Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation 
(commonly referred to as just Lionsgate).  Artisan Entertainment – a production and 
distribution company – was one of the most prevalent Lionsgate Companies in the dataset.  
Along with motion pictures, Lionsgate also produces television series, including the 
successful “Mad Men,” “Weeds,” and “South Park” series.  The Lionsgate information page 
made a point to state, “Lionsgate has earned 55 Academy Award® nominations and 10 
Oscar® wins over the past 10 years, more than any other independent studio.”33  This shows 
that film companies value their Academy Award statistics and want the public to recognize 
the importance of their wins and nominations. 
News Corporation almost placed into the conglomerate-type category for this study.  
The company is strictly an entertainment driven company, but it is heavily involved in the 
television component of the entertainment industry.34  Their portfolio includes channels such 
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as the National Geographic Channel and a variety of FOX channels, ranging from news to 
sports.  It was interesting to discover that News Corporation also has a stake in the once 
dominant social network Myspace, but even more so that this company, along with Disney 
and NBCUniversal, have partnered together to create Hulu.com.  According to the News 
Corporation website, Hulu is “the leading online video site helping people find and enjoy the 
world's premium video content when, where and how they want it.”35  I found it intriguing 
that three of the companies included in this study have teamed-up to work on a single project.  
The main motion picture element of News Corporation is 20th Century Fox.  However, the 
smaller independent film branch, Fox Searchlight Pictures is also included in the dataset. 
CBS Inc. serves as a single observation of this study, and this win – for Best 
Supporting Actress – was in 1990.  A description of today’s structure of CBS Inc. is not 
relevant for the data analyzed in this study. However, to provide a little information, the win 
was through their motion picture company Paramount (now a Viacom company).  CBS is 
still one of the largest broadcasting companies, but during the early 1990’s, they were a 
frontrunner of the entertainment business.  The highly competitive nature of the movie 
business seems to have limited the current success of CBS’s film companies since their 
current motion picture company CBS Films did not appear at any stage of the event study.36 
Viacom is actually a spin-off from CBS, Inc., taking place in the early 1970’s.  The 
two companies were reunited in 2000 when Viacom merged with CBS Corporation, but this 
joint-venture did not last long.  The companies soon parted ways only five years later in 
2005. As mentioned above, Viacom owns Paramount Pictures, and this film company is 
Viacom’s main contributor to the motion picture industry.  Other Viacom distribution 
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companies include Paramount Vantage, MTV Films, and Nickelodeon Films.  The Viacom 
website describes the focus of the company by stating, “Fueled by our world-class brands, 
Viacom serves an ever-growing population of kids, tweens, teens and adults who want their 
favorite media and entertainment, 24/7.”37  Like many of the other firms in this study, 
Viacom also partakes in the televised entertainment world, and their focus on the younger 
generation is shown through their networks, such as MTV, VH1, Nickelodeon, and 
COMEDY CENTRAL.   
 The last parent company of the study is Time Warner, Inc.  The main film company 
of Time Warner is Warner Bros. Entertainment, and this company is responsible for the 
majority of the Time Warner observations in this study.38  The other key operation of Time 
Warner is the Turner Broadcasting System.  However, the point of Time Warner’s history 
that needs to be brought to attention for the analysis of this study is the merger between AOL 
and Time Warner that took place in 2000.  This merger is an example of a possible source of 
problems for this event study.  The AOL – Time Warner merger is labeled as one of the 
worst mergers in history.  In the book, Deals from Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the 
Ashes, author Robert F. Bruner states: 
The merger of America Online (AOL) and Time Warner in 2001 offered two superlatives; the 
biggest deal to date and possibly the most notorious. Nearly $200 billion in market value 
evaporated in the months following the announcement of the deal. CEOs and other senior 
executives of both companies resigned early or were fired. Alleged accounting chicanery 
triggered a government investigation. Disaffected shareholders launched class action lawsuits.  
And eventually the AOL name was expunged from the corporate moniker.39  
 
This catastrophe takes place right in the middle of the event study’s time period, and one of 
the award observations actually lists AOL Time Warner as the parent company.  Outside 
                                                          
37
 Viacom Website: http://www.viacom.com/aboutviacom/Pages/default.aspx 
38
 Time Warner Website: http://www.timewarner.com/our-company/about-us/ 
39
 Bruner, Robert F. Deals From Hell: M&A Lessons That Rise Above the Ashes. Hoboken, New Jersey: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005. (265) 
22 
 
events, like mergers, can skew the results of event studies because they cause different 
pressures on the decision-making process of investors besides the specific one being 
observed in the event study.  However, even with the inclusion of AOL Time Warner’s 
historic failure, the results of this study should not be significantly affected.  All of the firms 
in this study are part of the entertainment business, including the digital segment of the 
entertainment industry, and had a stake in the internet bubble that also occurred during this 
study (which happens to be one of the causes for the AOL Time Warner disaster).  Each 
company would have been affected by the negative consequences of the crash in this market.  
With the affects of the internet market crash, most likely, having an even distribution among 
media companies, I do not feel any of the data from a specific company should be excluded 
for reasons connected to this incident. 
Additional Analysis  
Even though there are limitations from certain company characteristics as those listed 
above, the study is fairly complete. There are no missing values or problems within the 
information that constitutes as this event study’s dataset. All 60 observations have a complete 
event and estimation window. To partially resolve the problems of limited information and 
insufficient results that can arise from such a small sample of observations, I decided to run a 
number of follow-up statistical tests.  The variables used for these additional regressions 
included the six award categories, a multiple win variable, and a “blockbuster” variable 
(blockbuster meaning if a film had grossed over $100 million at the box office).  The results 
from the initial tests – abnormal returns on day 0, cumulative abnormal returns for the period 
[-1, 1], and cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-2, 2] – were the other data utilized 
for the additional investigations.  The outcomes of these tests were analyzed in order to 
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determine if any relationship existed between winning a certain category, winning multiple 
awards, or not being a “blockbuster” before the Academy Awards were aired and the stock 
returns of Oscar-winning parent companies. 
4. Methodology 
 In order to determine whether winning an Academy Award had any effect on the 
stock returns of a film’s parent company, I constructed an event study. The structure of this 
event study was organized in the standard form of many other such experiments, using the 
basic market model for my regressions:40 
     	 
   
  is the return on company i’s stock on day t, 
 is the market return on day t, and  is 
the error term for the individual company i on day t.  The event date for this study was set as 
the first trading day following the broadcast of the Academy Awards.  This was typically a 
Monday; however, from the years 1990 to 1998, the event date fell on a Tuesday. Starting in 
1999, the Oscars were aired on a Sunday and have been ever since.  The event window was 
set at a length of five days, capturing the two trading days prior to the event date and the two 
days thereafter.  I chose this event window in order to determine if there was any market 
anticipation or information leakage before the event.  The estimation window was set at a 
length of fifty days prior to the five days before the event date.  This estimation window 
length was used because it provided information for the two months preceding the Academy 
Awards, but was not too far away from the event as to include a large amount of outside 
occurrences.  I applied different event and estimation windows to my study, but the results 
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were almost identical across all variations of window length.  The event window of 5 days 
and the estimation window of 50 days are the measurements I decided to analyze. 
 Through the initial tests of my study the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns were gathered for the individual firms that captured each event date.  An abnormal 
return is the difference between a company’s realized return and the expected return 
calculated by the regression. The calculation for abnormal returns on day 0 is shown below:41 
Abnormal 
Return 
Actual 
Return 
Expected 
Return 
 AR0 =      
, –     E(
,) 
   
Once the abnormal returns were calculated, their significance was determined, and the results 
from these tests were analyzed. Further regressions were constructed using the data provided 
from these initial assessments. 
 Every observation of the study was coupled with a variable for each award category 
included in this study – Best Actor, Best Supporting Actor, Best Actress, Best Supporting 
Actress, Best Director, and Best Picture. A variable for companies that won multiple awards 
in these six categories was created, and there was also a variable for whether or not the movie 
was a “blockbuster” before the Academy Awards aired.  The variable categories were 
assigned a binary coefficient of one or zero. One was given to those companies that had won 
an award in that category, and a zero was given to those who had not.  The multiple award 
and “blockbuster” variables were also constructed as indicator variables, and a one was 
allotted to those companies that had won multiple awards and to those companies that were 
not of “blockbuster” status on each specific event date.  The multiple win category was 
established as an indicator variable because the affect on a company’s stock returns that 
would result from each additional win was assumed to follow a linear trend.  The 
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construction of the blockbuster variable was somewhat subjective since the definition of a 
blockbuster is an empirical question in itself.  A movie was defined as a blockbuster if it had 
earned more than $100 million at the box office.  This $100 million estimate was discounted 
by an annual 2% inflation for each year preceding 2011 to ensure an accurate measurement 
of the defined blockbuster requirement.  Appendix 2. A lists the Best Picture films included 
in this study and the film’s box office gross before the Academy Awards were broadcasted.  
Appendix 2. B contains a discount table of the $100 million equivalents for each year.   
It is important to note that the variable was assigned a one if it had not grossed the 
$100 million blockbuster requirement before the air date of the Academy Awards.  The 
release date was not taken into consideration for this variable which may slightly skew the 
results. However, only four out of the twenty Best Picture films were no longer showing in 
theaters at the time of the Academy Awards.  The information pertaining to the blockbuster 
variable was also found at the Internet Movie Database website, and the weekly box office 
totals originated from the online database Box Office Mojo.42  An example of how these 
variables were organized can be found at Appendix 2. C. 
Separate regressions were run for each observation in the study consisting of one 
dependent and one independent variable.  Three different dependent variables were tested, 
including the abnormal returns on day 0, the cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-1, 
1], and the cumulative abnormal returns for the period [-2, 2].  A final regression was run for 
each dependent variable that encompassed all eight independent variables.  These follow-up 
tests were implemented to determine whether any correlation existed between certain awards 
and positive or negative returns to parent companies.  I hoped to find a relationship between 
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winning a prestigious award, such as Best Picture, and positive abnormal returns to the film’s 
parent company.  
5. Results 
The study’s test on the event window period produced an average abnormal return on 
the event date of 0.198%, but the data shows a decline in the average abnormal return on the 
day following the event date with an increase in the return for the next day, as shown in 
Appendix 3. A.  A table is included along with the graph to show the exact average abnormal 
returns on each date of the event window, see Appendix 3. B.  This trend is puzzling because 
there is no explanation for the dip in returns on the subsequent trading day after the event.  
The total average abnormal return proved to be -0.063%.  However, these results were not 
significant at the 5% level which makes it difficult to interpret the overall outcome of this 
study. 
Since there were positive average abnormal returns on day 0 of the event window, I 
created a histogram of the event date to illustrate the distribution of the results: Appendix 3. 
C.  The interval of [-0.25, 0.00] measured in percentages, had the highest frequency of seven 
observations out of sixty. The majority of the observations were in the interval of [-1.50, 
1.50]; only seventeen of the sixty companies observed abnormal returns outside of this 
interval on the date of the event. Thirty-one of sixty companies had positive average 
abnormal returns on the event date, but since the majority of these observations were not 
significant, it is not possible to infer that the study resulted in positive average abnormal 
returns for the event date. 
The outcome of the cumulative abnormal return test was very similar to that of the 
average abnormal return analysis for the period of the event window.  The same N-shape 
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pattern can be seen in the cumulative abnormal return graph of the event window, Appendix 
3. D.  However, unlike the average abnormal return, the cumulative return just barely reached 
above zero into the positive return region.  On the date of the event, the cumulative abnormal 
return was 0.0006%, resulting with a total cumulative abnormal return of -0.0626% for the 
event window.  A table is included with the cumulative graph that shows the exact total for 
each of the five days of the event, Appendix 3. E.  The total cumulative abnormal return for 
the entire event study – the main result of this event study – which is the average of all sixty 
observation’s 5-day cumulative abnormal return was -0.3132%.  The outcome of this analysis 
was not as expected. I predicted there to be an overall positive cumulative abnormal return 
for the event window. However, this -0.3132% return is relatively close to zero, totaling not 
even a half of a percent abnormal return.  This value is not significant at the 5% level with a 
t-statistic of only - 0.5764, see Appendix 3. F for a summary of total event study statistics. 
I created a histogram for the cumulative abnormal return for the [-2, 2] day window to 
see if there was any trend or clustering of the return data: Appendix 3. G.  However, there 
appears to be an even distribution among the cumulative abnormal returns for the event 
window, ranging from -11.17% to 18.41% return.  The majority of CAR values fell between 
-8% and 8% with only three observations outside of this interval. The highest frequency was 
over the [2.00, 2.25] and [0.00, 0.25] percent intervals both with four firms out of sixty in 
each category.  Unlike the average abnormal return totals for the event date, the cumulative 
abnormal returns did not have a majority of positive observations.  There were only twenty-
seven of the sixty cumulative abnormal returns that were above a 0% return. 
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Significant Observations 
The only significant results of the entire study were the cumulative abnormal returns 
for three companies, meaning only 5.00% of the observations in this study were significant.  
The Sony Corporation had a cumulative abnormal return of 6.29% for 1993. General Electric 
experienced significant cumulative abnormal returns of 4.15% in 2006.  Comcast realized the 
last significant abnormal returns in 2009 with a cumulative abnormal return of 18.41%.  
Appendix 3. H documents these significant observations.  Appendix 3. I summarizes the 
awards that were won in each significant year, see Data 1. A for the films and recipients of 
these awards.  There was no overlap between the awards won by the three significant 
observations, and one interesting point about these statistics is the fact GE and Comcast did 
not produce significant cumulative abnormal returns in the same year.  This seems to indicate 
that the conglomerate nature of these companies might have affected the results of this study. 
General Electric and Comcast should have been almost equally affected by an 
NBCUniversal win in the same year, since ownership of the company is close to even: 51% 
and 49%, respectively.  The official company website of both General Electric and Comcast 
do not indicate which owner has more involvement with or control over NBCUniversal.  
However, I assume that Comcast may have been the chief overseer of the shared company.  I 
make this assumption based on their intention to purchase complete ownership rights of 
NBCUniversal in 2009.  This happens to be the same year that Comcast realized significant 
cumulative abnormal returns for the event window of this study.  It may be possible that 
Comcast took these abnormal returns as a sign that NBCUniversal was a profitable 
investment for the company – NBCUniversal is the sole motion picture branch of Comcast 
Corporation.  This assumption seems even more probable since the negotiations for the 
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Comcast takeover supposedly started the month after the Academy Awards took place in 
2009.  However, assuming Comcast had more control over NBCUniversal makes it difficult 
to interpret the study’s findings of significant cumulative abnormal returns for General 
Electric Company in 2006. 
General Electric’s significant observation was considerably lower than the other two 
firms.  Other observations of the study had returns well above or below those of General 
Electric, yet were not significant.  Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation had a cumulative 
abnormal return of -11.17% over the event window in 1999 and even General Electric had a 
return of -8.43% in 2009, but neither were significant values.  This means GE must have 
experienced comparatively low returns on average during the time period of the event study 
in 2006; for example, Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation had a cumulative abnormal 
return of 5.49% for their 2006 observation of the study that was not significant.  According to 
the company overview provided by the 2006 list of Fortune 500 companies, General 
Electric’s profits had decreased 2.8% since 2004.43   
One outside event that could have accounted for this low level return could be the 
purchases GE made during 2006.  Zenon Environmental, a water filtration technology firm, 
was purchased by General Electric in 2006.44  Smiths Aerospace was in the process of being 
acquired by GE in this year.45  If the market considered these acquisitions as not in the best 
interest of the company’s shareholders, either of these deals could account for the decrease in 
GE stock.  An interesting graph found in the 2009 annual report for General Electric 
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Company illustrates that 2006 was the year that GE stock started to noticeably underperform 
the S&P 500.46  An adaptation of this graph can be found at Appendix 3. J. The spread 
between the market index and value of GE stock indicates that 2006 was not the best year for 
General Electric (and of course, the onset of the financial crisis then began and the graph 
depicts how GE continued to do worse as the market fell over the next few years).  However, 
according to this same annual report, 2006 was the 2nd best year based on net income from 
their portion of NBCUniversal between the years 2005 – 2009.47  This could be one 
indication that the study did measure an impact for the year that NBCUniversal received an 
Academy Award. 
Comcast Corporation also offers evidence that their Academy Award win may be the 
cause of some residual profits realized in their significant observation year.  After the Oscars 
took place, Comcast announced they would stream 2009 Academy Award winning films and 
nominated films in HD – high definition – on their On Demand cable network.48  Even 
though these movies were offered after the event window of this study, Comcast found a way 
to incorporate their win into the other facets of their company.  It may be possible that 
investors took this into consideration when the NBCUniversal film won; investors might 
have realized that the complementary parts of Comcast’s business could capitalize on its win.  
 During the year of Sony Corporation’s significant observation, the company was 
developing its subsidiary Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc.  This company became 
responsible for Sony’s consumer-based computer entertainment products.49  Even though 
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public information on this company is limited because it is a privately owned firm, Sony 
Computer Entertainment appears to have done well over the years, releasing products such as 
the PlayStation 2, PSP, and the newest PlayStation 3.  Investors could have viewed the 
creation of this subsidiary as a large profit potential for the parent company.  Taking the 
successful track record of Sony Computer Entertainment into consideration, the 1993 
investors may have been correct.  The development of Sony’s subsidiary offers an example 
of how external events may have caused an increase in the stock price of Sony Corporation 
and affected the results of this study. 
 Whether the market was influenced by outside events or the investors took a 
particular interest in the Academy Awards during the years of significant observations, the 
returns measured for these three companies during the event window of this study were not 
close to average.  The average daily returns for each year that a significant observation took 
place – 1993 for Sony, 2006 for GE, and 2009 for Comcast – is considerably lower than the 
average abnormal return for the event window (See Appendix 3. K).  On average, Sony was 
realizing a daily return of 0.1653%, but their average abnormal return during the event 
window was 1.2587%.  The difference was not quite as drastic for General Electric with an 
average return of 0.0387% and an average abnormal return for the event window of 
0.8292%.  However, Comcast had a daily average return of only 0.0446%, and during the 
event window of this study, the company realized an average abnormal return of 3.6818%.  
Even though this positive influence on the stock of Comcast was measured during the event 
period of 2009, it is difficult to interpret these significant observations, especially when 
comparing just three results to the outcome of the study as a whole. 
32 
 
 The graphs of the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window of all three 
significant observations show no real correlation between the shape of their trend lines and 
that of the overall cumulative abnormal return graph for the study (See Appendix 3: L, M, 
and N).  The graphs for Sony and Comcast show a decreasing trend of cumulative abnormal 
returns, and General Electric’s graph depicts a positive slope for the cumulative abnormal 
returns during its significant observation.  No real assumptions can be made for the whole 
study based on three data points, and it is even more difficult to interpret these results when 
the significant events do not reflect the overlying trend for cumulative abnormal returns 
found in the study. 
Additional Analysis 
All values produced by the follow-up statistical tests were not significant – view the 
summary statistics for the average abnormal returns on the event date, cumulative abnormal 
returns for the period [-1, 1], and the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window [-2, 
2] located at Appendix 3: O, P, and Q, respectively.  The highest R-squared value of the 
study was produced by the all inclusive regression on the cumulative abnormal returns for the 
[-1, 1] window: 0.1051; this means only 10.51% of the variation in the cumulative abnormal 
returns for that window was explained by the changes in test variables.  However, this all 
inclusive regression did not have the highest Adjusted R-squared value of all additional 
regressions.  It did have the highest Adjusted R2 value of the three all inclusive tests of          
-0.0353, but this negative value indicates that there are variables included in this regression 
that do not help to predict the outcome of the test.  The Best Actress variable from the 
regression on abnormal returns for the event date produced the highest Adjusted R2 of the 
study: 0.0128.  Since this value is still considerably low, it further emphasizes that the Best 
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Actress variable does not offer an explanation for a parent company’s abnormal returns.  I 
provide an overview of the results produced by the additional tests, but it is important to keep 
in mind these results do not affect the dependent variables of this study and all coefficients 
can be equated to zero, since there was no evidence of significance.   
The variable for an award in the Best Actor category resulted in a negative coefficient 
for all regressions.  The Best Actor variable was the only variable that produced a negative 
coefficient for all three trials.  The majority of the coefficients produced from the three tests 
were negative with thirty-three negative results out of forty-eight coefficients, excluding the 
intercept.  A significant negative coefficient would imply that if a company won the variable 
award, they would actually realize a decrease in their stock price, and this is the complete 
opposite of the hypothesis stated at the beginning of the study – winning an award will result 
in positive abnormal returns for a parent company.  However, the coefficients generated in 
this study were typically not close to significance at the 5% level. 
Some variables did produce fairly large coefficients, even though they were not 
significant. The variables that had coefficient greater than an absolute value of 2% were the 
Best Actor and Best Actress variables of the regression on the cumulative abnormal returns 
for days [-1, 1] with values of -2.33% and -2.23%, respectively, and all eight variables of the 
regression on the cumulative abnormal returns for the event window, except the Best Picture 
award variable, were above an absolute value of 2%.  The Best Director variable reached       
-3.31%, but the only positive coefficients of this regression were the multiple wins and 
blockbuster variables with values of 2.69% and 2.10%, respectively.  These positive 
coefficients of around 2-3% were the type of results I was expecting to find from running the 
additional regressions on the event study dataset.  The all inclusive variable regressions that 
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produced the highest coefficients generated the significance test statistics closest to being 
significant at the 5% level as well.  The individual variable closest to significance was the 
Best Actor variable in the cumulative abnormal regression for the period [-1, 1] around the 
event date, having a coefficient of -2.33% with a t-statistic of -1.94% and p-value of 0.058.   
One variable produced positive coefficient results across all regressions, except the 
three all inclusive regressions: the Supporting Actress award variable.  However, there does 
not seem to be a reasonable explanation for why this Supporting Actress variable would have 
positive results while none of the other award variables did, especially those that tend to 
carry more prestige for companies, like Best Picture.  Since this variable was not even close 
to being significant, t-test values of 0.18, 0.19, 0.26 and p-values of 0.860, 0.851, 0.798 for 
the individual variable regressions, there is no need to dwell on this fact for any amount of 
time.  It is of more interest to examine a variable that had five out of the six possible 
coefficients result in positive values – the blockbuster variable.  Even though the results were 
not significant (a table of p-values and t-test statistics is included at Appendix 3. R), they 
provide a good example of the t-test and p-value statistics that were realized across all of the 
regressions. 
The blockbuster variable was established based on the idea that investors may be 
more willing to invest in those companies whose films had not grossed a significant amount 
of money before the Academy Awards, yet still managed to win the Best Picture Award at 
the Oscars. Over the event study’s twenty year period only eight films qualified for “non-
blockbuster” status (see Appendix 2. A for more details on the blockbuster variable films).  I 
was hoping to find results that supported the possible investing rationale of being impressed 
by the success of a film that was not as well-known and considering the Oscar win a huge 
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achievement for its parent company, showing that the parent company knows how to make 
wise decisions when funding projects that may be off the radar.  Of the eight Best Picture 
winners that had not grossed the $100 million equivalent amount by the Academy Awards, 
six of them were still in theaters.  Of these six films, after the award was announced five of 
them went on to gross over their respective $100 million equivalent before exiting theaters, 
Appendix 3. S.  For example, in 1993, Schindler’s List – a non-blockbuster film before the 
Oscars – grossed a total of 34.49% above its equivalent value while in theaters.  With five of 
the six films that were still in theaters at the time of the awards going on to become 
blockbusters after winning the Best Picture Award, there appears to be revenue generated for 
the parent companies of these smaller films from the announcement of the Best Picture 
Award; however, the regression on the blockbuster variable did not produce any significant 
values that would explain this revenue as a result of winning an Oscar.  
 The other non-award variable – the multiple win category – produced varying and 
some counterintuitive results.  Four of the six possible coefficients were negative.  I was 
expecting to see significant positive abnormal returns for this variable, meaning an increase 
in a company’s return if they were successful in more than one of the six award categories 
chosen for this study.  The only regression that realized an increase in abnormal returns close 
to what I expected for the multiple win variable was the all inclusive regression for the entire 
event window, producing a coefficient of 2.69%.  Unfortunately, all results for the multiple 
award variable were also not significant. 
6. Conclusion 
 This study was constructed based on the hypothesis that winning an Academy Award 
in one of the six major categories presented at the Oscars would produce positive abnormal 
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returns for the parent company of the award-winning film. However, this was not the 
outcome of the study.  Almost all of tests conducted generated values that were not 
significant. Only three of the sixty observations included in this study significant produced 
significant cumulative abnormal returns over the event window at the 5% level.  These 
results are difficult to interpret, and it is also hard to determine if there were high levels of 
outside interference that may have skewed the results.  Overall, I conclude there are two 
possible explanations for the findings of this event study – one where the lack of significance 
is to be expected and one where the lack of significance indicates a cause for concern. 
 First, investors may have anticipated the results of the Academy Awards well before 
the actual broadcast of the show.  These predictions would have been included into their 
previous investment decisions, and there is no residual to what has already been anticipated. 
This conclusion means investors must be quite good at predicting Oscar winners; however, 
this also poses problem for the study as a whole, finding no significant results amplifies the 
fact that there were problems with the study.  Parent companies should have been realizing 
positive abnormal returns through the event window if investors based part of their earlier 
decisions on the predictions they made.  From the lack of significant findings, this conclusion 
does not appear to be supported by the results of my study. 
 The outcome of this experiment could also be interpreted as, on the margin, there are 
no additional cash flows to Academy Award-winning companies immediately following the 
Oscar broadcast.  Under this conclusion, parent companies would not realize any significant 
returns from winning an award.  The lack of significant results is not as problematic because 
if there are no cash flows for winning an award, there is nothing to measure.  This 
explanation is plausible because only a small number of observations were significant in the 
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original cumulative abnormal returns test – three out of sixty – and no further significant 
results were found. 
I do not think it is possible to determine which conclusion best fits the results of this 
event study.  The second option where winning an award has no effect on the market price of 
parent companies’ stock does not seem feasible, but I do not fully support the idea that 
investors incorporate their predictions into their investment plan before the Oscars actually 
take place.  The best interpretation appears to be a third option that combines the two 
conclusions laid out above.  Some investors may form predictions when the Academy Award 
nominees are announced – typically four weeks before the ceremony’s broadcast – and 
include these predictions into their investment decisions.  This conclusion follows Randy 
Nelson, et al.’s article “What’s an Oscar Worth?” which illustrates that people use Oscar 
nominations as cues for which movies to view in theaters.50  Investors may do the same, 
using the nominee announcements as an indicator for which company to fund instead of 
waiting to see which films win the awards as my study suggests.  The second conclusion 
would be combined in such a way that states winning an Oscar in the award categories of 
Best Supporting Actor or Best Supporting Actress would not produce significant abnormal 
returns for the film’s parent company.  However, even if the combination of the outlined 
conclusions provides a better explanation for this study’s results, another experiment would 
need to be constructed in order to test this new hypothesis.   
Limitations 
The results of this study are difficult to interpret because of the plethora of possible 
conclusions, but even more so for the many limitations on the project.  One of the main 
implications of this study was the limited sample selection.  Almost half of the observations 
                                                          
50
 Nelson, Ibid. 
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had to be removed from the original dataset.  When constructing this experiment, I had 
planned to include nominations which would have meant a significant increase in the number 
of observations.  However, after further deliberation I realized the study could not include 
nominee information for what I intended to measure with my analysis.  Since winners are 
also nominated, it was not possible to differentiate between those companies who had just 
been nominated and those who won an award.  Many companies were nominated for a 
number of different films within a given year, but only won an award for a single film that 
year.  For example in 2006, Viacom had Dreamgirls nominated for Best Supporting Actor 
and Best Supporting Actress; Babel with two nominations for Best Supporting Actress and a 
nomination for Best Director and Best Picture; and Letters from Iwo Jima nominated for Best 
Director and Best Picture.  However, the only award Viacom won that year was Best 
Supporting Actress.  There would be no way to distinguish the affects of winning an award 
and being nominated for the other films.   
The timeline of this event also includes the beginning of our current recession. The 
market as a whole has preformed below par for the past few years, starting around the end of 
2007.  The existing conditions have taken a toll on the economy, and it seems firms across a 
variety of industries would have had difficulty realizing any significant positive returns 
during this period.  The study’s results from these years could reflect the poor investing 
climate and not the actual effect of winning an award that would be realized in a healthy 
market environment.  However, it was not possible to cut those years from the study, since 
the dataset already faced the restraint of a diminished size. 
Outside interference was also a large limitation, especially for those firms labeled as 
conglomerate-type businesses that partake in a wide range of industries.  There was no 
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thorough way to fully reduce the possibility of peripheral events affecting the stock of the 
parent companies included in this study.  Interference is a problem for most event studies; it 
is difficult to form a question well enough to measure just the result of a specific event.  The 
stock market is interconnected to a degree that makes it near impossible to eliminate all 
outside interference.  This results in studies that may measure not only the affects of an 
event, such as winning an Academy Award, but also the influence of other company 
decisions or incidents.  
Future Research 
 I would like to see future research build upon this study; my first suggestion would be 
to expand the study’s timeline to see if there is any change in the outcome.  Parent company 
data may be difficult to find for the early years of the Academy Awards, but I think a larger 
dataset would produce more significant results.  As stated above, alternative tests are possible 
if stock data is compiled for Academy Award nominees, but what the test plans to measure 
would have to be clearly defined.  A study could calculate the difference in returns between 
those companies that are just nominated for an award and those film’s that go on to win an 
Oscar.  This experiment would try to determine if winning an award has a greater affect on 
parent company stock than just being nominated for an award.   
 Further research on award ceremonies can benefit those companies that aim at 
winning an Academy Award. Not only does an Oscar provide a level of prestige, but with 
studies like this one, companies would know how much profit to expect from winning an 
award.  My study demonstrates only one of the possible questions that have yet to be 
answered surrounding the Academy Awards.  The world of televised award ceremonies 
remains wide open for future research and investigation.   
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Appendix 
 
1. A Table of 2010 Summary Statistics 
This table summarizes the wins and nominations each parent company received at the 2010 
Academy Awards that aired February 27, 2011 and exemplifies how the initial data collection 
was organized. 
 
2010 
27-Feb-11 
Companies Wins Nominations 
Lions Gate Entertainment Corporation  5 
Viacom 2 9 
Sony Corporation  4 
News Corporation 1 5 
The Weinstein Company 3 6 
Time Warner  2 
NBCUniversal  3 
The Walt Disney Company  1 
 
1. B Table of Sample Selection 
The table shows the original sample size and the exclusions made during the sample selection 
process. There were originally 120 firms, but half of the observations were cut due to reasons 
such as no available stock data for privately owned companies or an individual company 
received multiple awards during the Oscars ceremony.  This table also includes an addition to 
the sample size from the split ownership of NBCUniversal between General Electric 
Company and Comcast Corporation, resulting in a final sample size of 60 observations. 
 
Observation Number of firms 
Original Sample Size 120 
Addition from NBCUniversal Split 4 
Total Additions 4 
No Parent Company Information 19 
Multiple Wins 32 
Private Company 13 
Total Exclusions 64 
Final Sample Selection 60 
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1. C Parent Company Observation Statistics 
This table illustrates the distribution of observations among the nine parent companies 
included in the study.  Time Warner, Inc. and The Walt Disney Company comprised the 
majority of the sixty observations with thirteen wins each. General Electric Company and 
Comcast Corporation have partial ownership of NBCUniversal, and both parent companies 
are listed as separate observations in this study. 
 
Company Name Total Number of Wins 
CBS Inc. 1 
NBCUniversal, LLC. (4) 
– Comcast Corp. 4 
– General Electric Co. 4 
Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. 4 
News Corp. 6 
Sony Corp. 10 
Time Warner Inc. 13 
Viacom Inc. 5 
The Walt Disney Co. 13 
Total 60 
 
1. D Parent Companies that achieved the Most Oscars in a Single Year 
 This table lists the companies that won the most Academy Awards in a single year during the 
period of 1990-2010 and also the Oscars they won in that respective year.  The Walt Disney 
Company, Time Warner, and Orion Pictures Corporation tied with a total of four wins each at 
one awards ceremony; however, Orion Pictures is a privately owned corporation and does not 
appear in the sample selection of this study. 
 
Year Company Name Movie Title 
Best 
Actor 
Best 
Supporting 
Actor 
Best 
Actress 
Best 
Supporting 
Actress 
Best 
Director 
Best 
Picture 
2007 The Walt Disney Co 
There Will 
Be Blood X      
No Country 
for Old Men  X   X X 
2004 Time Warner 
Million 
Dollar Baby  X X  X X 
2003 Time Warner 
Mystic 
River X X     
The Lord of 
the Rings: 
The Return 
of the King 
    X X 
1998 The Walt Disney Co 
Life is 
Beautiful X      
Shakespeare 
in Love   X X  X 
1991 
Orion 
Pictures 
Corp 
The Silence 
of the 
Lambs 
X  X  X X 
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1. E Category Winners 1990-2010 
All winners of the six categories included in this study are listed in the table. The winners of 
2010 are not included in the study. The 2011 stock data was not yet available, but since it was 
the most up-to-date Academy Awards, I chose to include it these summary statistics. 
 
Year Best Actor 
Best 
Actress 
Best 
Supporting 
Actor 
Best 
Supporting 
Actress 
Best 
Director 
Best 
Picture 
2010 Colin Firth 
Natalie 
Portman 
Christian 
Bale 
Melissa 
Leo 
Tom 
Hooper The King's Speech 
2009 Jeff Bridges 
Sandra 
Bullock 
Christoph 
Waltz Mo'Nique 
Kathryn 
Bigelow The Hurt Locker 
2008 Sean Penn 
Kate 
Winslet 
Heath 
Ledger 
Penélope 
Cruz 
Danny 
Boyle Slumdog Millionaire 
2007 Daniel Day-Lewis 
Marion 
Cotillard 
Javier 
Bardem 
Tilda 
Swinton 
Joel Coen  & 
Ethan Coen 
No Country for Old 
Men 
2006 Forest Whitaker 
Helen 
Mirren 
Alan 
Arkin 
Jennifer 
Hudson 
Martin 
Scorsese The Departed 
2005 Philip S. Hoffman 
Reese 
Witherspoon 
George 
Clooney 
Rachel 
Weisz 
Ang 
Lee Crash 
2004 Jamie Foxx 
Hilary 
Swank 
Morgan 
Freeman 
Cate 
Blanchett 
Clint 
Eastwood Million Dollar Baby 
2003 Sean Penn 
Charlize 
Theron 
Tim 
Robbins 
Renée 
Zellweger 
Peter 
Jackson 
The Lord of the 
Rings: The Return 
of the King 
2002 Adrien Brody 
Nicole 
Kidman 
Chris 
Cooper 
Catherine 
Zeta-Jones 
Roman 
Polanski Chicago 
2001 Denzel Washington 
Halle 
Berry 
Jim 
Broadbent 
Jennifer 
Connelly 
 Ron 
Howard A Beautiful Mind 
2000 Russell Crowe 
Julia 
Roberts 
Benicio 
Del Toro 
Marcia 
Gay Harden 
Steven 
Soderbergh Gladiator 
1999 Kevin Spacey 
Hilary 
Swank 
Michael 
Caine 
Angelina 
Jolie 
Sam 
Mendes American Beauty 
1998 Roberto Benigni 
Gwyneth 
Paltrow 
James 
Coburn 
Judi 
Dench 
Steven 
Spielberg Shakespeare in Love 
1997 Jack Nicholson 
Helen 
Hunt 
Robin 
Williams 
Kim 
Basinger 
James 
Cameron Titanic 
1996 Geoffrey Rush 
Frances 
McDormand 
Cuba 
Gooding, Jr. 
Juliette 
Binoche 
Anthony 
Minghella The English Patient 
1995 Nicolas Cage 
Susan 
Sarandon 
Kevin 
Spacey 
Mira 
Sorvino 
Mel 
Gibson Braveheart 
1994 Tom Hanks 
Jessica 
Lange 
Martin 
Landau 
Dianne 
Wiest 
Robert 
Zemeckis Forrest Gump 
1993 Tom Hanks 
Holly 
Hunter 
Tommy 
Lee Jones 
Anna 
Paquin 
Steven 
Spielberg Schindler's List 
1992 Al Pacino 
Emma 
Thompson 
Gene 
Hackman 
Marisa 
Tomei 
Clint 
Eastwood Unforgiven 
1991 Anthony Hopkins 
Jodie 
Foster 
Jack 
Palance 
Mercedes 
Ruehl 
Jonathan 
Demme 
The Silence of the 
Lambs 
1990 Jeremy Irons 
Kathy 
Bates 
Joe 
Pesci 
Whoopi 
Goldberg 
Kevin 
Costner Dances With Wolves 
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2. A Best Picture Films and Blockbuster Box Office Gross Revenue Statistics 
The table displays all Best Pictures award winners from 1990 to 2010 and the amount each 
film grossed at the U.S. box office while in theaters. The highlighted films are those that were 
not of “blockbuster” status at the time the Academy Awards aired, grossing less than the 
equivalent of $100 million in today’s terms. The films that were out of theaters by the date of 
the Academy Awards are marked with a double star (**). Only thirteen out of the twenty-one 
films displayed above were part of the blockbuster regression. The other films were 
productions of privately owned companies or excluded from the study for a different reason; 
the year 2010 was not included in the event study, since the stock data was not yet available 
for 2011.  These omitted observations are indicated by a carrot (^). 
 
Year Event Date Film Gross ($) 
2010 27-Feb-11 The King's Speech^ 114,231,030 
2009 7-Mar-10 The Hurt Locker**^ 12,647,089 
2008 22-Feb-09 Slumdog Millionaire 98,354,395 
2007 24-Feb-08 No Country for Old Men 64,291,179 
2006 25-Feb-07 The Departed 131,805,297 
2005 5-Mar-06 Crash** 53,382,847 
2004 27-Feb-05 Million Dollar Baby 64,851,738 
2003 29-Feb-04 The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King 364,115,612 
2002 23-Mar-03 Chicago 134,014,534 
2001 24-Mar-02 A Beautiful Mind^ 154,704,651 
2000 25-Mar-01 Gladiator^ 186,870,377 
1999 26-Mar-00 American Beauty^ 108,468,063 
1998 21-Mar-99 Shakespeare in Love 73,192,745 
1997 23-Mar-98 Titanic 494,514,331 
1996 24-Mar-97 The English Patient 63,154,818 
1995 25-Mar-96 Braveheart 73,512,126 
1994 27-Mar-95 Forrest Gump 318,434,225 
1993 21-Mar-94 Schindler's List^ 59,849,473 
1992 29-Mar-93 Unforgiven** 74,681,912 
1991 30-Mar-92 The Silence of the Lambs**^ 130,719,208 
1990 25-Mar-91 Dances With Wolves^ 139,106,936 
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2. B 2010 $100 Million Discounted Equivalents 
The table shows the dollar amounts that are equivalent to $100 million in 2010. This 
information was used to determine if a film was of blockbuster status before the Academy 
Awards broadcast. The annual inflation rate was estimated to be 2%. 
 
Blockbuster Discount Table 
Annual Inflation Rate: 2% 
2010: $100,000,000 
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
98,039,216 96,116,878 94,232,233 92,384,543 90,573,081 
2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
88,797,138 87,056,018 85,349,037 83,675,527 82,034,830 
1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 
80,426,304 78,849,318 77,303,253 75,787,502 74,301,473 
1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 
72,844,581 71,416,256 70,015,937 68,643,076 67,297,133 
 
2. C Additional Test Variables 
This table illustrates how the information for the follow-up regressions was organized.  All 
variables were structured as indicator variables: one indicating a win and zero signifying a 
loss.  For the multiple win variable, a one indicated multiple awards for that parent company 
in a single year.  A one for the blockbuster variable meant the parent company won the Best 
Picture category that year, but the film did not reach the $100 million equivalent before the 
Academy Awards broadcast. 
 
event_date comnam actor actress sup_actor sup_actress picture director multi_win blockbuster 
25feb2008 DISNEYWALT CO 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 
3. A Average Abnormal Return for Each Day of the Event Window 
 The graph shows the daily average abnormal return for all sixty observations over the event 
window.  The table located at 3. B contains the exact values that are represented in this chart. 
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3. B Average Abnormal Returns for the Event Window 
This table lists the daily average abnormal return for all sixty observations over the event 
window of the study.  The total average abnormal return is also included. 
 
Day Average Abnormal Return (%) 
-2 -0.1659707 
-1 -0.0305748 
0 0.1984690 
1 -0.4573080 
2 0.1421685 
 
Total Average Abnormal Return (%) 
-0.0626432 
 
3. C Average Abnormal Returns on the Event Date 
The histogram displays the distribution of average abnormal returns for all sixty observations 
on the event date of the study – the next trading day following the Academy Awards 
broadcast.  The range with the highest frequency of seven out of the sixty observations was 
the [-0.25, 0.00] category. 
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3. D Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window 
The graph illustrates the cumulative abnormal return of the sixty observations of this study 
over the event window.  Table 3. E contains the exact values for the five days represented on 
this chart. 
 
 
 
3. E Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Event Window 
This table summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns of all sixty observations over the 
event window of the study. 
 
Day Cumulative Abnormal Return (%) 
-2 -0.1659707 
-1 -0.0982728 
0 0.0006412 
1 -0.1138461 
2 -0.0626432 
 
3. F Event Study Statistics 
The table displays the statistics for the entire event study. The total cumulative abnormal 
return for all sixty observations over the event window and the corresponding variance and   
t-test statistic are shown. 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Total Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (%) Variance 
T-Test 
Statistic 
60 -0.31322 0.0017714 -0.5764494 
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3. G Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the Event Window 
This histogram shows the distribution of cumulative abnormal returns of all sixty 
observations over the event window of this study.  No overlying trend appears in the data, but 
the majority of observations were negative.  The range with the highest frequency is a tie 
between the [0.00, 0.25] and [2.00, 2.25] categories with four observations each. 
 
 
 
3. H Significant Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The table displays the three observations of this study that were significant at the 5% level.  
The cumulative abnormal return and t-test statistic is shown for the 1993 Sony Corporation, 
2006 General Electric Company, and 2009 Comcast Corporation observations. 
 
Event Date Company Name CAR (%) T-Test Statistic 
03/30/93 Sony Corp 6.2935 2.3018 
03/06/06 General Electric Co 4.1461 2.8474 
02/23/09 Comcast Corp 18.4091 4.5765 
 
3. I Significant Observation Awards 
This table summarizes the awards each parent company won during their respective 
significant observation years.  There was no overlap of the awards achieved by each company 
and the categories Supporting Actress and Best Picture do not account for a significant 
observation win. 
 
Event Date Company Name Actor Supporting Actor Actress 
Supporting 
Actress Director Picture 
03/30/93 Sony Corp   X    
03/06/06 General Electric Co  X   X  
02/23/09 Comcast Corp X      
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3. J Financial Performance Comparison between General Electric and S&P 500 
The chart compares the financial performance of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Stock Index and 
the stock of General Electric Company and shows the difference in outcomes if $100 was 
invested in each company on December 31, 2004 and measured annually for the following 
five year period. All quarterly dividends were reinvested, and the total cumulative dollar 
returns represent the value these investments would have December 31, 2009. This graph is 
an adaptation of the “Comparison of Five-Year Cumulative Return among GE, S&P 500, and 
Dow Jones Industrial Average” graph found in the 2006 Annual Report of General Electric 
Company.  The table displays the exact dollar values of each investment during the five year 
period. 
 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GE 100 99 108 111 51 49 
S&P 500 100 105 121 128 81 102 
 
3. K Significant Observation Annual Average Daily Return and Average Abnormal 
Returns for the Event Window 
 This table shows the annual average daily return and the average abnormal returns for the 
event window of the three significant observations of the study. 
 
Company Name Year Annual Average Return (%) 
Event Window 
Average Abnormal Return (%) 
Sony Corporation 1993 0.1653 1.2587 
General Electric Company 2006 0.0387 0.8292 
Comcast Corporation 2009 0.0446 3.6818 
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3. L 1993 Sony Corporation Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window 
The chart displays the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the 
1993 Sony Corporation significant observation. 
 
 
 
3. M 2006 General Electric Company Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event 
Window 
 The chart shows the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the 
2006 General Electric Company significant observation. 
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3. N 2009 Comcast Corporation Cumulative Abnormal Return for the Event Window 
The chart displays the cumulative abnormal return over the event window of this study for the 
2009 Comcast Corporation significant observation. 
 
 
 
3. O Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Abnormal Returns on 
the Event Date 
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each 
additional regression ran on the abnormal returns realized by the sixty observations of this 
study on the event date.  The coefficient and standard error term of the intercept and adjusted 
r-squared of each regression are also included. 
 
Dependent Variable: Abnormal Returns on Event Date 
Regressor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Best Actor -0.0049 (0.0049)        
-0.0079 
(0.0074) 
Supporting 
Actor  
0.0015 
(0.0052)       
-0.0020 
(0.0073) 
Best 
Actress   
-0.0072 
(0.0055)      
-0.0103 
(0.0080) 
Supporting 
Actress    
0.0009 
(0.0048)     
-0.0038 
(0.0082) 
Best 
Director     
-0.0005 
(0.0054)    
-0.0008 
(0.0107) 
Best 
Picture      
-0.0017 
(0.0055)   
-0.0046 
(0.0103) 
Multiple 
Wins       
-0.0044 
(0.0047)  
-0.0019 
(0.0102) 
Blockbuster        -0.0007 (0.0076) 
0.0056 
(0.0111) 
Intercept 0.0034 (0.0027) 
0.0016 
(0.0027) 
0.0036 
(0.0025) 
0.0017 
(0.0028) 
0.0021 
(0.0026) 
0.0023 
(0.0026) 
0.0037 
(0.0029) 
0.0021 
(0.0024) 
0.0094 
(0.0070) 
Summary Statistics 
Adj. R2 -0.0004 -0.0158 0.0128 -0.0167 -0.0171 -0.0157 -0.0016 -0.0171 -0.0716 
n 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
 
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
-2 -1 0 1 2
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 A
b
n
o
rm
a
l 
R
e
tu
rn
Days from Event
CAR
54 
 
3. P Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for the Period [-1, 1] around the Event Date 
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each 
additional regression ran on the cumulative abnormal returns realized by the sixty 
observations of this study over the period [-1, 1] around the event date.  The coefficient and 
standard error term of the intercept and adjusted r-squared of each regression are also 
included. 
 
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-1, 1] 
Regressor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Best Actor -0.0100 (0.0081)        
-0.0233 
(0.0120) 
Supporting 
Actor  
-0.0060 
(0.0085)       
-0.0196 
(0.0119) 
Best 
Actress   
-0.0060 
(0.0091)      
-0.0223 
(0.0130) 
Supporting 
Actress    
0.0015 
(0.0080)     
-0.0181 
(0.0134) 
Best 
Director     
0.0013 
(0.0089)    
-0.0158 
(0.0173) 
Best 
Picture      
0.0053 
(0.0091)   
-0.0047 
(0.0167) 
Multiple 
Wins       
-0.0028 
(0.0077)  
0.0133 
(0.0162) 
Blockbuster        0.0087 (0.0125) 
0.0189 
(0.0180) 
Intercept 0.0001 (0.0045) 
-0.0013 
(0.0044) 
-0.0016 
(0.0042) 
-0.0034 
(0.0046) 
-0.0032 
(0.0043) 
-0.0041 
(0.0042) 
-0.0018 
(0.0048) 
-0.0038 
(0.0040) 
0.0179 
(0.0114) 
Summary Statistics 
Adj. R2 0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0097 -0.0166 -0.0169 -0.0113 -0.0150 -0.0089 -0.0353 
n 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
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3. Q Summary Statistics for the Additional Regression on the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for the Event Window 
This table contains all coefficients and standard error terms for the variables of each 
additional regression ran on the cumulative abnormal returns realized by the sixty 
observations of this study over the event window.  The coefficient and standard error term of 
the intercept and adjusted r-squared of each regression are also included. 
 
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-2, 2] 
Regressor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Best 
 Actor 
-0.0081 
(0.0126)        
-0.0257 
(0.0188) 
Supporting 
Actor  
-0.0155 
(0.0130)       
-0.0327 
(0.0186) 
Best 
Actress   
0.0026 
(0.0141)      
-0.0217 
(0.0205) 
Supporting 
Actress    
0.0032 
(0.0123)     
-0.0241 
(0.0210) 
Best 
Director     
-0.0043 
(0.0137)    
-0.0331 
(0.0272) 
Best 
Picture      
0.0037 
(0.0141)   
-0.0048 
(0.0263) 
Multiple 
Wins       
-0.0020 
(0.0119)  
0.0269 
(0.0254) 
Blockbuster        0.0081 (0.0193) 
0.0210 
(0.0282) 
Intercept -0.0007 (0.0069) 
0.0010 
(0.0067) 
-0.0037 
(0.0066) 
-0.0042 
(0.0071) 
-0.0021 
(0.0066) 
-0.0039 
(0.0066) 
-0.0024 
(0.0074) 
-0.0039 
(0.0061) 
0.0224 
(0.0178) 
Summary Statistics 
Adj. R2 -0.0101 0.0071 -0.0166 -0.0161 -0.0155 -0.0160 -0.0167 -0.0142 -0.0735 
n 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
 
3. R Blockbuster Variable Statistics 
The table displays statistics for the blockbuster variable of each regression ran during the 
follow-up tests of the study, consisting of the regression on the average abnormal returns on 
the event date, cumulative abnormal return for the period [-1, 1] around the event date, and 
the cumulative abnormal return for the event window.  The t-test and p-value statistics for 
each blockbuster variable are also included. 
 
Regression 
Individual 
Variable 
Regression (%) 
Individual 
T-Test 
Individual 
P-Value 
All Inclusive 
Variable 
Regression (%) 
All 
Inclusive 
T-Test 
All 
Inclusive 
P-Value 
Abnormal 
Return Day 0 -0.07 -0.10 0.92 0.56 0.51 0.61 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return [-1, 1] 
0.87 0.69 0.49 1.89 1.05 0.30 
Cumulative 
Abnormal 
Return [-2, 2] 
0.81 0.42 0.68 2.10 0.74 0.46 
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3. S Films that achieved Blockbuster Status after the Academy Awards Ceremony 
This table contains the total box office gross revenue values of the five Best Picture films that 
went on to reach blockbuster status after the Academy Awards broadcast.  The films listed 
received an indicator value of 1 for the follow-up regressions of the study, meaning they were 
not of blockbuster status at the time of the Oscars ceremony.  However, these films exceeded 
their $100 million equivalent after receiving the Best Picture Award at the Academy Awards 
in their respective years, and the amount by which they surpassed their $100 million 
equivalent is also displayed in the table.  See Appendix 2. B for the summary of equivalent 
values for the period of 1990 to 2010. 
 
Year Film Total Domestic Box Office Gross ($) 
Gross Above 
$100 million 
Equivalent (%) 
2004 Million Dollar Baby 100,422,786 13.09 
1998 Shakespeare in Love 100,241,322 27.13 
1996 The English Patient 78,651,430 3.78 
1995 Braveheart 75,609,945 1.76 
1993 Schindler’s List 96,045,248 34.49 
 
